

June 8, 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

Attached is a complete revision of the Disarmament Policy Guidance, as first stated by Governor Stassen in his memorandum of May 9 and as later affected by agreed amendments and changes and decisions taken by you. The attached complete revision has been drafted by the State Department, in collaboration with representatives of Defense, AEC, CIA, and myself. Its purpose is to state in a more readable and logical form a comprehensive text.

The following questions have not been resolved in the attached revision:

1. Should the title, "U.S. Position on First Phase of Disarmament" be sub-titled, "Tentative - For Discussion with Allies"?
2. In paragraph 11 b., should the armaments to be deposited include armaments of "post-World War II manufacture" or armaments of "World War II or subsequent manufacture"? The Navy maintains that because of the limited new ship construction since World War II, the deposit of only post-World War II ships would be disadvantageous to the U.S.
3. Should the armaments to be deposited under b(2) as set forth in the agreement, "bear a rough relation to the reduction in military forces" referred to in b(1)?
4. Under the agreement, the only "blueprint" will presumably relate to a very limited initiation zone (principally Arctic). The agreement provides for aerial and ground inspection of this very limited zone. Because of the limited size of the zone, the value of such inspection is confined to the establishment of inspection techniques and some reduction in the element of surprise.
5. Paragraph 11.d. provides for verification by mobile inspection tests of deposits specific quantities of armaments deposited under paragraph 11.b., of reductions in military forces, and of data on resources and funds devoted to military purposes. Is this provision acceptable, in view of your statement that no verification system can be effective without both aerial and ground inspection components?

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*NSC Review Completed *

6. The Director of Central Intelligence believes the verification by mobile teams provided in 11.d. is substantially adequate to check the validity of inventories of armaments outside the limited inspection area. He therefore still believes it desirable, by omitting the last line of 11.a., and retaining 11.d. as it stands, to provide for "blueprints" covering major military items situated anywhere within the USSR and the US.

Robert Cutler